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ABUSING THE JUDICIAL POWER: A GEOGRAPHIC
APPROACH TO ADDRESS NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS AND
STATE STANDING
ABSTRACT
The judicial branch’s primary function in a tripartite system of government
is to institute checks and balances on the executive and legislative branches by
interpreting and applying the law. This command is limited under Article III of
the Constitution, which gives federal courts the power to decide only a limited
set of cases and controversies. Article III judges are appointed and confirmed
with life tenure. This system of life appointments evidences the Framers’ intent
to preserve the federal judiciary as a body of insulated, apolitical decisionmakers as opposed to a third political arm of the federal government. For over
two centuries, the nation’s judicial system has been a revered institution of law
and order, maintaining the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
The recent and increasing use of nationwide injunctions, which implement
expansive theories of state standing and equitable power, puts this notion in
jeopardy.
In the context of nationwide injunctions, state attorneys general are forum
shopping to bring suits to the most sympathetic ears. In doing so, state attorneys
general have asserted attenuated forms of standing to have their cases heard.
Because these state actors are specifically seeking out the most favorable district
court, they are in a greater position to find a court willing to expand the limits
of standing and equity to hear their case. The idea that an injunction should be
a primary means of seeking redress is a relatively new development advanced
in a sharply divided political climate. To preserve and protect the role of the
judicial branch, some measures must be taken to dissuade state actors and
federal courts from abusing the judicial power.
This Comment explores how the traditional limitations of standing and
equity are being vastly expanded by recent nationwide injunctions. Much of the
blame for this expansion rests on individual state attorneys general and
sympathetic district judges. In identifying these individuals as the root cause of
such expansion, this Comment specifically tailors a solution by advocating for
federal legislation that places limitations on district courts hearing cases
initiated by state actors seeking nationwide injunctions.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing use of “nationwide injunctions” by federal courts presents a
threat to the separation of powers and has frustrated some of the most significant
executive policies of both the Obama and Trump Administrations.1 Nationwide
injunctions, also commonly referred to as “universal” or “national” injunctions,
are non-class action lawsuits that “purport to bar the federal government from
enforcing a law or policy as to any person or organization, anywhere in the
United States,” as opposed to a traditional injunction that only applies to the
plaintiffs of the case.2 This practice is a more recent phenomenon in which
“courts have gradually assumed the power to enter national injunctions against
federal statutes and regulations.”3 Recent cases implementing nationwide
injunctions expose two glaring issues. First, courts have accepted relaxed views
of standing, particularly in the context of state actors seeking to enjoin executive
policies.4 Second, courts have acted contrary to traditional notions of equity by
turning the extraordinary instance of an injunction applied to non-parties into
the new norm.5
In the past decade, the increased use of nationwide injunctions has garnered
significant media attention in the context of lawsuits directly seeking injunctive

1
OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., LITIGATION GUIDELINES FOR CASES PRESENTING THE POSSIBILITY OF
NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 1 (2018).
2
Id.; see Jonathan Remy Nash, State Standing for Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal
Government, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985, 1988 (2019) (citing Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide”
Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
335, 338, 349–53 (2018)).
3
See Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws Nationwide,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-nationwide-injunctions/
574471/.
4
Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a
concrete and personal way. . . . This requirement is not just an empty formality.”)), with Hawaii v. Trump, 265
F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1149 (D. Haw. 2017) (“The State alleges standing based upon injuries to its proprietary and
quasi-sovereign interests . . . . Plaintiffs allege that EO–3 will hinder the University from recruiting and retaining
a world-class faculty and student body.”), and Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he States allege that the teaching and research missions of their universities are harmed by the Executive
Order’s effect on their faculty and students who are nationals of the seven affected countries.”).
5
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015); Washington v. Trump, No. C170141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Hawaii, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1145;
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936–37 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Casey Tolan, California Has Now
Sued the Trump Administration 50 Times—and Racked Up Plenty of Victories, MERCURY NEWS (May 14, 2019,
1:13 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/05/14/california-lawsuits-trump-administration-xavierbecerra-50-times/; see also Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417, 421 (2017) (arguing that “[i]n equity . . . injunctions did not control the defendant’s behavior
against nonparties”).
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relief brought by state attorneys general against the federal government.6 These
individual state actors are filing suit by asserting the rights of their citizens
generally or claiming attenuated forms of direct injuries.7 This form of litigation
against the federal government has increased following “the Supreme Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which relaxed the standing requirements for
states” by holding that Massachusetts had “special solicitude” to sue in its quasisovereign capacity.8 Established standing limitations require a plaintiff to show
a concrete and particularized injury that is “actual or imminent,” rather than a
hypothetical or intangible harm.9 Once standing has been met, courts have
traditionally exercised equitable power by tailoring a specific ruling to the
parties of the case, rather than the nation as a whole.10
Current nationwide injunctions initiated by state actors usually begin with
an individual state attorney general seeking out a favorable district court.11 The
lawsuit then asserts standing to sue based on the theory that their state, or third
parties that may be associated with their state, will experience an injury if the
executive policy is enforced.12 The individual district judge, whose court was
sought out specifically for a favorable ruling,13 then issues a preliminary
nationwide injunction that halts the executive policy as it applies to the nearly
330 million people living in the United States.14

6

See Tolan, supra note 5.
See Hawaii, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1149; Washington, 847 F.3d at 1159.
8
Bradford Mank & Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1955, 1955, 1957 (2019); see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 (stating that Massachusetts was entitled
to special solicitude in the Court’s standing analysis to protect its quasi-sovereign interests).
9
See Texas, 809 F.3d at 150 (stating that “the states have the burden of establishing standing . . . [and]
must show an injury that is ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and redressable by a favorable ruling’” (internal citation omitted)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962) (noting that the plaintiff must allege a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“[A]
plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.”).
10
See generally Bray, supra note 5 (noting the increase in applying injunctions to non-parties over the
past decade to thwart executive policy).
11
Tolan, supra note 5 (citing Becerra’s response on why he filed suit in the Northern District [Bay Area]
instead of the Eastern District of California [Sacramento], where his office was located).
12
See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1160 (finding that the states had standing to sue under the “third party
standing” doctrine in which the states could “assert the rights of . . . students, scholars, and faculty” of state
universities affected by the Executive Order).
13
See Bagley & Bray, supra note 3 (“[N]ational injunctions encourage forum shopping . . . [b]ecause a
litigant only has to win in a single court to stop the implementation of a congressional statute or agency
rule . . . [and] [i]t’s no coincidence that . . . many of the high-profile challenges to Trump policies have been
brought in deep-blue states.”).
14
See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last
visited June 9, 2021).
7
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The increased use of nationwide injunctions sought by states positions the
judicial branch at a crossroad between its ability to carry out its essential
function of judicial review15 and becoming a political tool in itself. In 1788,
James Madison wrote, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”16 To protect the other two branches from judicial
overreach, Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to
only “cases” and “controversies.”17 This limitation is a jurisdictional and
remedial command that requires a plaintiff to show that they have “standing” to
file suit.18 Even in the context of state actors, standing “is not just an empty
formality” but requires a showing of a concrete and personalized injury to that
plaintiff.19 Standing is an important doctrine in the context of the modern-day
judicial branch, which has seen an increase in public law litigation.20
In addition to the undesirability of nationwide injunctions based on standing
and equitable grounds, the issuance of nationwide injunctions presents
procedural issues that pose a threat to effective judicial review of important legal
issues.21 If a singular district court is able to issue a definitive ruling against the
government, the development of law in regard to that issue is frozen by “the first
final decision rendered” and the Supreme Court is “deprived of the benefit it
receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult
question.”22

15
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
16
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
17
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . [and] controversies,” in law
and equity that arise “under” the Constitution).
18
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
19
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“[T]he party bringing suit must show that the action
injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is not just an empty formality.” (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
20
See Nash, supra note 2, at 1990–91 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288–1304 (1976)).
21
OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 1, at 4.
22
Id. (“[A]llowing only one final adjudication . . . would substantially thwart the development of
important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue” and would
“deprive [the Supreme] Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a
difficult question before . . . [the] Court grants certiorari.” (quoting United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160
(1984)).
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One has to ask: Why is the judicial system currently experiencing nationwide
injunctions if they are based on attenuated forms of standing,23 expand the
court’s equitable power, and pose a threat to the development of law?24 The
answer is layered and political, but it is relevant to note that the use of these
nationwide injunctions has “accelerated dramatically” due to claims of executive
overreach in both the Obama and Trump Administrations.25 In a period of 8
years, Texas sued the Obama Administration 48 times, and California upped the
ante by suing the Trump Administration 110 times over a period of just 4 years.26
By all appearances, the increased use of these nationwide injunctions seems to
have become a political tool for state actors to utilize the federal court system to
block executive policy.27 In less than a decade, the rate of individual state actors
suing the federal government to implement nationwide injunctions has
quadrupled.28 This accelerating practice operates as an “equal opportunity
offender” that can leave a bitter taste in the mouths of both Republicans and
Democrats when the time comes for a district judge, potentially in a circuit on
the opposite side of the country, to enjoin a law or policy that they support.29
Using nationwide injunctions as a political tool can have the adverse
consequence of allowing an individual state to “freeze” up enforcement of
executive policies in regions of the country that may enjoy overwhelming
support for such policies.30 This danger is especially prevalent in an era of
increasing political polarization among the various states and geographic areas
of the country.31 Although states have asserted standing to bring these lawsuits
23
Courts are currently allowing lawsuits to proceed based on hypothetical injuries to the state’s quasisovereign interests. See Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1149 (D. Haw. 2017); Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017).
24
See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
25
Bagley & Bray, supra note 3.
26
Byrhonda Lyons, California’s Bill for Fighting Trump in Court? $41 Million So Far, CAL MATTERS
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://calmatters.org/justice/2021/01/california-cost-trump-lawsuits/.
27
Bray, supra note 5, at 418–19; see Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015);
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017);
Hawaii, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1145; City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936–37 (N.D. Ill. 2017);
Tolan, supra note 5.
28
Tolan, supra note 5 (noting that California sued the Trump Administration fifty times in less than two
and a half years, while Texas sued the Obama Administration forty-eight times in total over a period of eight
years); Lyons, supra note 26 (noting that by the end of the Trump Administation’s four years in office, California
had sued the Administration 110 times, costing the state $41 million and counting).
29
Bagley & Bray, supra note 3.
30
See Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural
Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1087 (2017) (noting that once a “policy is enjoined nationwide” the
government “cannot enforce it, the regulated parties do not sue, and courts never hear the issue again . . . . The
law is frozen against the government[.]”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31
The Big Sort—Political Segregation, ECONOMIST (June 19, 2008), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2008/06/19/the-big-sort (claiming that “Americans are increasingly forming like-minded
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based on their individual state’s sovereignty,32 the practice ultimately infringes
upon the rights of other states when it is not limited geographically.
In approaching the issue of expansive state standing in the context of
nationwide injunctions, this Comment identifies the root causes leading to their
increased use and sets out a bright-line solution of a geographic statewide
limitation when state actors bring suit against a federal law or policy. Under a
statewide limitation, an injunction brought by a state actor may only apply to the
geographic state in which the enjoining district judge is located. This limitation
would have a secondary effect in preventing a group of states from joining in an
action to claim “party” status.33 If a state attorney general wishes to enjoin a
federal policy as it applies to their state,34 they would be forced to litigate the
matter in their own backyard. If a statewide injunction would be impractical to
have any net effect on an executive policy, the limited injunction would still
carry the force of a declaratory judgement that was historically sufficient. These
limitations should be enacted by federal legislation because Congress has the
power to create and define the jurisdiction of “inferior” federal courts under
Article III, Section 1.35 Furthermore, the Supreme Court should address standing
requirements in the context of lawsuits brought under theories of a state’s quasisovereign interests, or the rights of its citizens generally.36 An injunction should
only apply to direct and identifiable harms experienced by the parties bringing
suit, as opposed to a broad and unidentifiable class of persons. Although
addressing the issue of standing and geographically limiting injunctions in the
context of state actors bringing suit is not a complete solution to address
concerns over the abuse of the judicial power by lower courts,37 such a limitation
would restrict politically motivated state actors from promoting the abuse of the

clusters . . . . Conservatives are choosing to live near other conservatives, and liberals near liberals[.]”).
32
See Texas, 809 F.3d at 146, 151; Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2017); Hawaii,
265 F. Supp. 3d at 1149; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 239 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (stating that “the States will retain, under the proposed constitution, a very extensive
portion of active sovereignty”).
33
See Mank & Solimine, supra note 8, at 1957 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING,
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 279 (7th ed. 2015)); see also Texas, 809 F.3d at 146 (“Twenty-six states . . . challenged DAPA under
the Administrative Procedure Act[.]”).
34
See Nash, supra note 2, at 1992 (citing the political motivations of state attorneys general to litigate
against executive policies “with which she and her constituents disagree”).
35
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
36
See infra Part III.B.
37
Theoretically, a private actor could bring suit seeking a nationwide injunction if they were able to assert
a direct and verifiable harm to meet traditional standing requirements. However, the vast majority of cases
garnering significant media attention have been initiated by state actors. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 146; Washington,
847 F.3d at 1160; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018).
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judicial power to impose their political views on all states and territories—not
just their own.
To support this proposition, Part I first highlights recent applications of
nationwide injunctions against both the Obama and Trump Administrations. Part
II subsequently looks to the origin of nationwide injunctions, as well as potential
constitutional arguments over the scope of the courts’ equitable power. Part III
addresses the expansion of state standing in the context of nationwide
injunctions and why this is detrimental to our judicial system. Part IV looks to
how the dangers of broad injunctions outweigh any perceived benefits, as well
as the political factors leading to their use. Lastly, Part V sets out a concrete
solution to limit an injunction geographically to a statewide effect if the suit is
brought by a state actor against a federal law or policy, and advocates for the
Supreme Court to address the breadth of various standing doctrines.
I.

RECENT APPLICATIONS OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS

Under the Obama and Trump Administrations, two executive policies were
hampered by the implementation of nationwide injunctions in high-profile
cases.38 The first instance is President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (DAPA),39 and the second
instance is President Trump’s string of executive orders temporarily halting
immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, commonly referred to as the
“travel ban.”40 This Part first discusses the examples of nationwide injunctions
against both the Obama and Trump Administrations before turning to the
Supreme Court and executive branch’s response to this practice.
A. Nationwide Injunction Against the Obama Administration
This Comment first turns to a nationwide injunction, as applied against the
Obama Administration, that occurred in 2015 when Texas spearheaded a large
coalition of states seeking to strike down DAPA.41 Under DAPA, “[o]f the
approximately 11.3 million illegal aliens in the United States, 4.3 million would
be eligible for lawful presence.”42 The status of “lawful presence” would allow
38
See Texas, 809 F.3d at 150; see Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); see Richard
Wolf, Travel Ban Timeline: 17 Months, Three Versions, Two Appeals Courts, One Supreme Court, USA TODAY
(Apr. 25, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/04/25/trump-travel-bantimeline-supreme-court/547530002/.
39
Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
40
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
41
Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
42
Id. at 148.
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previously ineligible aliens to receive government benefits, social security, and
health insurance under Part A of the Medicare program.43 Over half of U.S.
states—twenty-six in total—joined as parties to the litigation against DAPA.44
The states put forward three separate grounds to enjoin DAPA.45 “First, they
asserted that DAPA violated the procedural requirements of the APA as a
substantive rule that did not undergo the requisite notice-and-comment
rulemaking.”46 Alternatively, the states claimed that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) “lacked the authority to implement the program even
if it followed the correct rulemaking process, such that DAPA was substantively
unlawful under the APA.”47 Lastly, the states asserted “that DAPA was an
abrogation of the President’s constitutional duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’”48
The district court held that only Texas had standing based on the fact that it
would suffer a “financial injury by having to issue driver’s licenses to DAPA
beneficiaries at a loss.”49 The court also stated that Texas would have standing
under an alternative theory that they referred to as “abdication standing,” based
on the fact that the United States had “exclusive authority over immigration but
has refused to act in that area.”50 Once the court determined that standing was
met, Texas was successful on the merits of its argument.51 Because DAPA was
not a procedural rule, it required notice and comment under the APA.52 The court
stated that “conferring lawful presence on 500,000 illegal aliens residing in
Texas” would force the state to spend “millions of dollars.”53 Such modification
of substantive rights was only nominally procedural, and “the exemption for
such rules of agency procedure” could not apply.54 The circuit court rejected a
limited statewide injunction for Texas in disregarding DAPA, and instead held
that “a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because DAPA
beneficiaries would be free to move among states.”55 The ruling in Texas v.
United States effectively halted the implementation of DAPA and prevented any
43

Id.
Id. at 146.
45
Id. at 149.
46
Id. (claiming that DAPA violated the APA).
47
Id. at 149; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C) (stating that courts may hold unlawful and set aside
agency action).
48
Texas, 809 F.3d at 149.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 149–50 (citing Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 636–43 (S.D. Tex. 2015)).
51
Id. at 176.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984)).
55
Id. at 188.
44
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other state from recognizing lawful presence of potentially DAPA eligible
aliens.56 The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling and did not address the issue
of whether a nationwide injunction was permissible.57
B. Nationwide Injunctions Against the Trump Administration
The second example of a nationwide injunction is a string of recent cases
against President Trump’s “travel ban” titled “Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.”58 President Trump’s executive
order affected predominantly Muslim countries for the stated purpose of
preventing future terrorist attacks against the American people.59 The executive
order suspended visas and denied entry into the United States of individuals from
seven countries60 for a period of ninety days so “[t]he Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations” could implement a program to
“identify individuals seeking to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis with
intent to cause harm.”61 The States of Washington and Minnesota quickly
brought suit to enjoin President Trump’s executive order.62
In Washington v. Trump, the district court ruled that the states met the burden
necessary to implement a nationwide injunction because “they have shown that
they are likely to succeed on the merits” and “established a likelihood of
irreparable injury.”63 The court reasoned “that the circumstances brought before
it . . . [were] such that it must intervene to fulfill its constitutional role in our

56

See id. at 187–88.
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
58
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Wolf, supra note 38; Washington v.
Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1230 (D. Haw. 2017).
59
See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (asserting the need for enhanced
screening of entrants into the United States based on the fact that “when State Department policy prevented
consular officers from properly scrutinizing the visa applications of several of the 19 foreign nationals who went
on to murder nearly 3,000 Americans”); see also Abigail Hauslohner, During First Two Years of ‘Muslim Ban,’
Trump Administration Granted Few Waivers, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2019, 6:21 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/immigration/during-first-two-years-of-muslim-ban-trump-administration-granted-fewwaivers/2019/09/24/44519d02-deec-11e9-8dc8-498eabc129a0_story.html (“Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.) pointed
out that the countries Trump targeted derived from a list of nations the Obama administration had chosen for
added scrutiny after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.”).
60
See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, § 4 (Jan. 27, 2017).
61
See id.
62
See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
3, 2017).
63
See id. at *6.
57
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tripart government.”64 Less than a week later, the Ninth Circuit denied the
United States’ emergency motion for a stay of the injunction pending appeal.65
The court held that the states had standing to sue under a theory that “the
teaching and research missions of their [state] universities” were harmed, and
alternatively under the “third party standing” doctrine in which the states could
“assert the rights of . . . students, scholars, and faculty” of state universities
affected by the executive order.66 Ultimately, the Trump Administration was
forced to revise its “travel ban” to target only six countries and revised the ban
for the second time after it was struck down in Hawaii v. Trump.67 The travel
ban’s third iteration was finally upheld by the Supreme Court, which reversed
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.68 The Supreme Court ruled that President Trump’s
Proclamation fell well within the “comprehensive delegation” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)69 and was a lawful exercise of
discretion.70
Even though the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was overturned, the Court—for the
second time in two years—avoided the specific question of whether a
nationwide injunction was permissible.71 The Court stated, “[o]ur disposition of
the case makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the nationwide scope
of the injunction issued by the District Court.”72 However, Justice Thomas wrote
a concurrence urging the Court to go further:
The District Court imposed an injunction that barred the Government
from enforcing the President’s Proclamation against anyone, not just
the plaintiffs. Injunctions that prohibit the Executive Branch from
applying a law or policy against anyone—often called “universal” or
“nationwide” injunctions—have become increasingly common.
District courts, including the one here, have begun imposing universal
injunctions without considering their authority to grant such sweeping

64

Id. at *9.
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
66
Id. 1159–60.
67
See Wolf, supra note 38; Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1229–30 (D. Haw. 2017).
68
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); see Proclamation No. 9,645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161
(Sept. 24, 2017).
69
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408 (“Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class
of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by
proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of
aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
70
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408.
71
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016); see Trump,
138 S. Ct. at 2423.
72
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
65
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relief. These injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal
court system—preventing legal questions from percolating through the
federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and making every case a
national emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch.
I am skeptical that district courts have the authority to enter universal
injunctions. These injunctions did not emerge until a century and a half
after the founding. And they appear to be inconsistent with
longstanding limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III
courts. If their popularity continues, this Court must address their
legality.73

Justice Thomas’s concurrence was the first overt pronouncement by a Supreme
Court Justice condemning the current use of nationwide injunctions.74 Justice
Thomas noted that the current practice was encouraging forum shopping for
sympathetic district courts and taking a heavy toll on the judicial branch.75
C. Continued Criticism by the Supreme Court
In 2020, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, also addressed the
practice of issuing nationwide injunctions in Department of Homeland Security
v. New York.76 There, the Court granted a stay from a nationwide injunction that
halted DHS’s new definition of the term “public charge.”77 “Public charge”
means an individual that is likely to seek public benefits over a designated
threshold.78
Under the Trump Administration, DHS issued a ruling that required aliens
seeking an extension of stay or change in status to “demonstrate that they have
not . . . [sought] to extend or change” their receipt of public benefits over an
amount set by DHS.79 In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch noted that “a single
judge in New York enjoined the government from applying the new definition
to anyone, without regard to geography or participation in this or any other
lawsuit.”80 Justice Gorsuch concluded his remarks by asking, “[w]hat in this
gamesmanship and chaos can we be proud of?”81 Although the Court was
73

Id. at 2424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id.
75
Id. at 2425.
76
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599–601 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 599.
78
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, 248).
79
Id.
80
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. at 599 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
81
Id. at 601.
74
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hearing the case due to a nationwide injunction implemented in the Southern
District of New York, the Northern District of California and the District of
Maryland had both issued universal injunctions against the rule,82 and “the
Eastern District of Washington had entered a similar order, but went much
farther geographically, enjoining the government from enforcing its rule
globally.”83 Furthermore, the Northern District of Illinois fashioned “its own
injunction” that was “limited to enforcement within the State of Illinois.”84
Through the Supreme Court’s ruling, all of the above-mentioned injunctions
were null and void with one exception: Illinois.85 When the smoke cleared, only
Illinois’s statewide injunction was left standing, at least for the time being.86
Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, marks the
second time in two years that the Court has set aside a nationwide injunction and
issued condemning remarks, yet fell short of addressing the looming issue.87
D. Executive Response to Nationwide Injunctions
The Department of Justice under both the Obama and Trump
Administrations argued “that ‘equitable relief must be tailored to the particular
final agency action and parties before the court’ and ‘should be no more
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs,’” which is consistent with Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas’s
respective concurrences.88 Both political parties taking the same position on this
issue when they are in office seems to bolster the proposition that nationwide
injunctions brought by state actors are increasingly becoming political tools.89
82

Id. at 599.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 600.
86
See id.; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., Public Charge Inadmissibility Determinations in Illinois,
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/public-charge-inadmissibility-determinations-illinois (last updated Feb. 24,
2020).
87
See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. at 600–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see Trump
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–25 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
88
See OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 1; see also Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that universal injunctions are “beginning to take a toll on the federal court system” and that “they appear
to be inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief”); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S.
Ct. at 600 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“The real problem here is the increasingly common practice of trial courts
ordering relief that transcends the cases before them.”).
89
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–25 (Thomas, J., concurring); see OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 1 (noting
that the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations have “consistently . . . argued against granting relief outside
of the parties to a case”); see also Katie Benner, Nationwide Injunctions Speak to Judiciary’s Growing Power,
Barr Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/us/politics/barr-nationwideinjunctions.html (arguing that “injunctions allow federal judges to overreach beyond their geographically
83
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Although the concurrences speak to the lower court’s equitable authority
over nationwide injunctions, perhaps the more alarming issue is the expansion
of state standing in the context of nationwide injunctions.90 Permitting this
expansion of state standing past the grounds articulated in Massachusetts v. EPA
would effectively allow a state to unilaterally halt executive policy based on
intangible injuries of unidentified persons rather than a direct injury to the state
itself.91 This represents a dangerous proposition that would essentially do away
with Article III limitations on standing requiring a “concrete injury” when a state
is filing suit.92
II. ORIGIN OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS AND EQUITABLE ISSUES
PRESENTED
The dramatic increase in the use of national injunctions has sparked debate
from legal historians over their constitutionality and origin.93 Some historians
argue that the nonexistence of “nationwide” injunctions applying to non-parties
is merely “the result of a historical accident” rather than “any inherent
limitations on the remedies available in equity.”94 These historians claim that
“[e]quity courts in 1789 could ‘adapt their decrees to all the varieties of
circumstances . . . and adjust them to all the peculiar rights of all the parties in
interest’ . . . to do complete justice.”95 They also note that “[i]n the late 1800s
and early 1900s, federal courts sitting in equity issued labor injunctions”
applying to thousands of workers, and “very few federal laws were held
unconstitutional in the [eighteenth] and [nineteenth] centuries.”96 The opposition
argues that nationwide injunctions cannot be traced to any traditional form of

prescribed domains and . . . undermine the idea that the judiciary is the impartial arbiter of American democracy”
and that nationwide injunctions have “politicized the judicial branch”).
90
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2017).
91
Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“[T]he party bringing suit must show that
the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.” (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))), with Washington, 847 F.3d at 1160 (claiming that state universities could
assert standing based on third parties’ alleged injuries).
92
Nash, supra note 2, at 2005–06 (“It is generally accepted that the tripartite constitutional standing
inquiry will most often turn on the injury prong. The court has made clear that only an injury that is ‘concrete
and particularized,’ and ‘either actual or imminent’ will suffice.”).
93
See Christopher J. Walker, Legal Historians Weigh In on the Nationwide Injunction Debate, YALE J.
REGUL. (Nov. 20, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/legal-historians-weigh-in-on-the-nationwide-injunction-debate/.
94
See id. (discussing the argument of an “amicus brief filed by legal historians Amalia Kessler, Robert
Gordon, Bernadette Meyler, Gregory Ablavsky, Stanley Katz, Hendrik Hartog, and Kellen Funk” in a Seventh
Circuit sanctuary city case).
95
See id. (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 28 (2d ed. 1839) (1836)).
96
See id.
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equity,97 and “equitable principles leave no room for nationwide injunctions.”98
The following section details the origins of nationwide injunctions, the rise in
their usage, and the constitutionality of extending such injunctions to nonparties.
A. Origin of the Nationwide Injunction
Although an injunction in traditional English courts of equity was not
permitted “against the Crown,” equitable courts retained the power to “resolve
a number of claims at once” to avoid a “multiplicity of suits.”99 A “bill of peace”
would be issued by these courts, which allowed a Chancellor to “consolidate a
number of suits . . . between two parties.”100 This consolidation of cases by a
Chancellor was permissible to avoid “repeated instances of litigation.”101 The
idea of a class action lawsuit for direct injuries to a group of similarly situated
individuals finds support in the consolidation of cases under a bill of peace.102
However, an early English Chancellor hearing a handful of similar cases under
one device is not analogous to a nationwide injunction halting an executive order
over millions of people.103 Proponents of nationwide injunctions are
overextending a sensible justification when they assert the position that because
a “bill of peace” could control a “defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis nonparties,”
courts in turn have equitable authority to issue present-day nationwide
injunctions against the federal government.104 Rather, the limited history of
nationwide injunctions in U.S. case law demonstrates that while courts have
some power to enjoin non-parties in an injunction, such power does not
necessarily extend to the entire country.

97

Bray, supra note 5, at 425.
See Walker, supra note 93 (noting Samuel Bray’s counterargument citing the rejection of nationwide
injunctions in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
99
Bray, supra note 5, at 425.
100
Id. at 426 (citing JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 245–46, at 464–
68 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941)).
101
Id. at 425–26.
102
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979) (noting that class action
lawsuits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are “designed to allow an exception to the usual
rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only”); Bray supra note 5, at
426; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2–3) (requiring “questions of law or fact common to the class” and “claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”).
103
See U.S.CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 14.
104
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1080–81 (2018).
98
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1. Early Cases of Semi-Broad Injunctions
The modern conception of nationwide injunctions is markedly absent from
our nation’s judicial history until the 1960s.105 In the early twentieth century,
federal courts consistently granted injunctions that only prohibited enforcement
of a law against individual plaintiffs.106 There remains a select few cases that
seem to be outliers against this general and accepted practice in the context of
injunctions against federal laws.107 One such case, occurring in 1918, is Hammer
v. Dagenhart, where the court affirmed an injunction that extended to the entire
Western District of North Carolina.108 In Hammer, the Court held that Congress
invaded the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment when it sought
to prohibit the transportation of goods that were manufactured using child labor,
and to “sustain (the) statute . . . would sanction an invasion by the federal power
of the control of a matter purely local in its character,”109 Although the injunction
applied to non-parties, it was limited to the geographic district in which the court
presided.110 The plaintiff in Hammer did not attempt to seek an injunction
applying anywhere outside of the State of North Carolina, let alone the country
as a whole, nor did the court entertain such a possibility.111
An article written by Professor Mila Sohoni advocates for a contrary
proposition by claiming that for over a century, “lower federal courts have been
issuing injunctions that reach beyond the plaintiffs.”112 Sohoni notes that in
1913, the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction “in the months
preceding its opinion in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan” after the district court
dismissed the case for want of equity.113 Lewis Publishing Co. challenged the
105
Bray, supra note 5, at 428 (claiming that “no national injunctions against federal defendants [were
implemented] for the first century and a half of the United States,” and they were “rejected as unthinkable as
late as Frothingham v. Mellon, and to have been conspicuously absent as late as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer”).
106
See Bray, supra note 5, at 436; Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539, 545, 546, 562 (1923)
(holding an act providing fixed minimum wages for female employees was an unconstitutional because “[a]n
intereference (with the liberty to contract) . . . must be deemed to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State,” but only granting relief to the parties of the case); Panama
Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405, 433 (1935) (granting a plaintiff-protective injunction against
unconstitutional orders and regulations against oil producers); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268, 277
(1918).
107
See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277.
108
See id. at 268, 277.
109
Id. at 251, 276–77.
110
Bray, supra note 5, at 436.
111
Id. (noting that the plaintiff “did not seek, and the court did not award, a national injunction”).
112
Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 921 (2020)
(rebutting “the proposition that the universal injunction is a recent invention”).
113
See id. at 924–25 (first citing J. of Com. & Com. Bull. v. Burleson, 229 U.S. 600, 600 (1913) (per
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Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912, contending that the act deprived the
publishers of the privileges of the mail if they did not provide the required
information for second class mail privileges under the act.114 The preliminary
injunction was granted only for “other newspaper publishers,” and not just the
specific plaintiff who brought the case.115 Although the injunction applied to
non-parties, it was not a “nationwide injunction” in the modern sense, and the
lawsuit was ultimately unsuccessful.116 Even so, the Court did employ a
temporary form of an injunction that applied to newspaper publishers
generally.117
In the context of broad injunctions against state law, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters “affirmed a universal injunction” and “remains good law” as landmark
precedent almost a century later.118 In Pierce, a group of private primary schools
challenged the constitutionality of an Oregon law requiring all children from the
ages of eight to sixteen to attend public schools.119 The Court ruled that Oregon’s
compulsory public education law violated the Fourteenth Amendment120 and
“unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”121 In making this
determination, the Court upheld the preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the state law’s application to all private or religious schools in
Oregon and stated that “[p]revention of impending injury by unlawful action is
a well-recognized function of courts of equity.”122 The lower court did not
simply afford relief from the compulsory education law by issuing a preliminary
injunction as it applied to the individual private schools that brought the case
(“plaintiff-protective injunction”), but it also upheld the preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Oregon law against anyone in the state.123 This
affirmance of an injunction against a state law, applying on a statewide level,
including non-parties, has been commonly upheld by the Supreme Court.124
curiam); then citing Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 296 (1913)).
114
Lewis Pub. Co., 229 U.S. at 296–97.
115
See Sohoni, supra note 112, at 924–25.
116
See Lewis Pub. Co., 229 U.S. at 311.
117
See Sohoni, supra note 112, at 924–25.
118
Id. at 925 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
119
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
120
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
121
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), to support the Court’s
determination “that the Act of 1922” abridged the liberty of parents and guardians in directing the “upbringing
and education” of their children, and stating that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State”).
122
Id. at 536.
123
See id. at 531–33.
124
See id. at 529–30, 536 (affirming preliminary restraining order against the enforcement in the state of
Oregon of the Compulsory Education Act); Sohoni, supra note 112, at 926 (claiming that “the Court affirmed
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As the executive branch expanded in the mid-twentieth century,125 cases
asserted against the federal government invoked similar arguments regarding the
scope of presidential powers that are currently being asserted.126 Comparatively,
the 1952 case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer presents perhaps one
of the strongest examples of executive overreach in our nation’s history when
juxtaposing the actions of President Truman with claims asserted against
President Trump.127 In Youngstown, President Truman issued an executive order
against certain steel companies directing the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of most of the nation’s steel mills.128 There was “no statute that
expressly authorize[d] the President to take possession of property,” but rather
an idea that the President held cumulative powers to take possession of private
industry as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy” during the Korean
War.129 The mill owners sought a protective injunction and sought to challenge
an injunction that reached beyond the plaintiffs’ children and beyond the alleged plaintiff class” in the context
of a state law); Frost, supra note 104, at 1081 (“[T]he historical practice supports the conclusion that courts have
always had the authority to issue equitable relief that encompasses nonparties.”).
125
See Jay Cost, The Expanding Power of the Presidency, HOOVER INST. (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://www.hoover.org/research/expanding-power-presidency (“Enterprising chief executives innovate new
pathways of power, are met with little resistance, and thus the innovations soon become norms . . . [m]ost
presidents since [Theodore Roosevelt] have contributed to this process, regardless of party or ideology [with the
exception of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge].”).
126
See Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to the President, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2018) (noting that the executive power, and its corresponding success at the Supreme
Court, expanded during the years of Franklin Roosevelt, “peaked during the Reagan administration and has
declined steadily since then”). There are three situations regarding the exercise of presidential power that effects
judicial deference to the president: First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,” and second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,” and
third, “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Compare id. at 588–89 (“The seizure could not stand because Congress had the
exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the
Constitution[.]”), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004) (“Absent suspension of the writ [of
habeas corpus] by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to . . . [Due P]rocess[.]”).
127
Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582, 588–89 (striking down an executive order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the nation’s steel mills), with City of Chicago v. Sessions,
264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936–38 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (claiming “Chicago’s local policy . . . , which restricts local
officials’ participation in certain federal immigration efforts” required a nationwide injunction against “new
conditions on an annual federal grant,” which prohibited policies restricting local authorities from sharing
information with the Immigration and Naturalization Service “regarding the citizenship status of an individual”),
and Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408, 2419 (2018) (citing that “foreign nationals seeking admission have
no constitutional right to entry” and the INA explicitly states, “[w]henever the President finds that the entry of
any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, he may by proclamation . . . suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of alien”).
128
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
129
See id. at 585, 587.
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the President’s actions as “lawmaking, a legislative function which the
Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President.”130
The plaintiffs in Youngstown present a classic example of a broad, protective
injunction that is specifically tailored to the parties of a particular case.131
The first successful case to contemplate the use of a nationwide injunction,
in its contemporary sense, against a federal law did not arise until Wirtz v. Baldor
Electric Co. in 1963.132 In Wirtz, representatives of the electronics industry filed
a complaint to “set aside the Secretary’s minimum wage determination for the
industry,” pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, alleging that the Secretary of
Labor violated the APA.133 The case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit, who
“found the Secretary’s determination invalid” and “resolved the scope of the
injunction, conditional on the district court finding standing.”134 The court
claimed that the scope of the nationwide injunction was proper regardless of
whether the suit was “maintainable as a class action,” because “[p]arties
aggrieved by administrative agency orders act as representatives of the public
interest in seeking judicial review . . . [and] no artificial restrictions of the courts
power to grant equitable relief in the furtherance of that interest can be
acknowledged.”135 Wirtz seems to have been an anomaly for the time because
the court did not cite any “prior cases [to offer] support.”136
2. Birth of the Modern Nationwide Injunction
Subsequent cases in the late-1960s and early 1970s advanced the idea of a
nationwide injunction with a truly “preliminary national injunction” being
issued in Harlem Valley Transportation Ass’n v. Stafford in 1973.137 These early
cases represent somewhat of an intermediate position between more recent
nationwide injunctions and previous plaintiff-based or statewide injunctions.138
130

Id. at 582.
See id. at 582–83.
132
Bray, supra note 5, at 438.
133
Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 520–22 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
134
Bray, supra note 5, at 437 (citing Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 520, 531–35).
135
Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 533, 535. Wertz cited dicta from Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power
Commission, which denied both the Commission’s motion to dismiss and the Association’s request for a stay.
Id. (citing Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 923 (1958).
136
Bray, supra note 5, at 438.
137
Id. at 439–40 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass’n v. Stafford, 360
F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
138
Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–83 (noting that the parties sought a plaintiff-protective
injunction), with Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (“It is
not beyond the power of a court . . . to issue a nationwide injunction.”), and Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2423 (2018) (reversing “the grant of the preliminary [nationwide] injunction as an abuse of discretion,” which
131
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The initial use of a “preliminary” nationwide injunction was a temporary
measure conditioned on class certification, rather than an outright nationwide
injunction without such certification.139
In Harlem Valley, a group of plaintiffs brought suit against the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), its Chairman, and the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency.140 The plaintiffs sought “declaratory and
injunctive relief against alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 . . . in the procedures attendant upon abandonments of rail lines
under the jurisdiction of the ICC.”141 The plaintiffs intended “to maintain the
proceeding as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2),” alleging that they
were a representative class.142 The court issued a temporary nationwide
injunction, pending class certification; Judge Frankel was ambivalent on the
issue after “[b]oth the United States and the ICC” not only conceded, but insisted
“that a preliminary injunction in . . . [the] case would ‘affect the agency in the
entire scope of its authority and jurisdiction.’”143 Harlem Valley provides a
unique issue, one in which the government has conceded the scope of the issue
and agreed with the plaintiffs on the merits.144 A preliminary injunction was not
needed when the government conceded the issue; “the court should [have]
instead—granted a declaratory judgment.”145
Following this line of cases, the idea of a nationwide injunction in the
context of non-class action lawsuits were not directly or principally sought after
by plaintiffs as the desired remedy.146 Cases invoking the use of a nationwide
injunction were mainly “isolated occurrences.”147 The first consistent examples
of a party directly seeking a “nationwide injunction,” as opposed to simply being
awarded one, arose during George W. Bush’s presidency.148 During the Bush
Administration, “federal district courts in California took the lead, enjoining
various environmental policies.”149 Nationwide injunctions throughout the

was granted by the districts courts of Maryland and Hawaii).
139
See Harlem Valley, 360 F. Supp. at 1060.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1059.
142
Id. at 1060.
143
Id. at 1060 n.2; see Bray, supra note 5, at 440.
144
Bray, supra note 5, at 441.
145
Id.
146
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 89 (1968) (noting that the Supreme Court contemplated but did not
specifically endorse a nationwide injunction); Harlem Valley, 360 F. Supp. at 1060.
147
Berger, supra note 30, at 1078.
148
See id. at 1078–79.
149
Id.
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2000s “became more frequent and continued to gain prominence.”150 Under
President Obama, there was an increasing amount of nationwide injunctions
implemented against a wide array of politically divisive social issues.151 These
injunctions garnered more recognition in the media than those issued against the
labor policies and environmental regulations of the Bush Administration.152
“The subject matter of these injunctions included[:] a school bathroom policy
for transgender students, hospice Medicare reimbursements[,] . . . an antiterrorism law, and the U.S. military’s ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ policy.”153
One particular case against the Obama Administration, Texas v. United
States, as discussed above, gained considerable recognition.154 The Supreme
Court declined to reverse the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and avoided the specific
question of whether a nationwide injunction was permissible.155 After the Court
dodged the issue, there was a floodgate of litigation in which states utilized this
tool to combat an array of executive policies under President Trump.156 Recent
cases implementing nationwide injunctions against the Trump Administration
have appeared mainly in the context of the Administration’s policies toward
immigration and sanctuary cities.157 The frequency of litigation has ballooned in
the past two and a half years,158 leading to much debate over the propriety of
nationwide injunctions. While an increase in these lawsuits was desirable for
individuals opposing President Trump’s policies, the current practice is much
less appealing to supporters of the Biden Administration. All persons, regardless
of political beliefs, should be careful about supporting judges who make bad
precedent.

150

Id. at 1078 (citing Bray, supra note 5, at 39).
See id.
152
Compare Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815–16, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a
preliminary injunction against the government, who asserted “that Title VII and Title IX require that all persons
must be afforded the opportunity to have access to restrooms, locker rooms, showers, and other intimate facilities
which match their gender identity rather than their biological sex”), with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Nos. C 05-1144 PJH, C 04-4512 PJH 2007 WL 1970096, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007)
(enjoining a forestry rule), and Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (setting aside a
minimum wage in the electrical motors and generators industry).
153
Berger, supra note 30, at 1078.
154
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
155
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272.
156
See Tolan, supra note 5; Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at
*3–4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1144-45 (D. Haw. 2017); City of
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936–37, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
157
See supra note 156.
158
See Tolan, supra note 5; Benner, supra note 89.
151
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B. Constitutionality of the Court’s Equitable Powers in the Context of
Nationwide Injunctions
Federal courts are granted the “judicial” power directly from Article III of
the Constitution.159 Article III, Section 1 vests the judicial power “in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”160 Article III, Section 2 holds that “the judicial power
shall extend to all cases . . . [and] controversies,” in law and equity that arise
under the Constitution.161 Through this direct delineation, federal courts have
jurisdiction over nine different forms of cases or controversies.162 However,
Congress may establish lower federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, as
it sees fit.163
The initial debate regarding the validity of nationwide injunctions hinged on
the scope of the federal courts’ equitable power under Article III, Section 2.164
One position against broad injunctions, held by Professor Samuel Bray,
contends that Article III, Section 2 gives federal courts the “power to decide
cases for parties, not questions for everyone,”165 and “federal courts are
obligated to trace their equitable doctrines and remedies to the historic tradition
of equity.”166 The opposing position asserts that the courts “have always had
authority to issue equitable relief that encompasses nonparties,” and “the
historical understanding of the ‘judicial power’ does not bar modern courts from
issuing broad equitable relief.”167
The historical practices of federal courts help to illuminate the constitutional
debate over the permissibility of nationwide injunctions.168 Professor Sohoni
159

See U.S. CONST. art. III.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
161
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
162
Id.
163
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
164
See id.; Bray, supra note 5, at 421; Frost, supra note 104, at 1080–81.
165
Bray, supra note 5, at 421 (citing Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)).
166
Bray, supra note 5, at 421 (citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 318–29 (1999)); Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations
on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000); Judith Resnik, Constricting
Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003)).
167
Frost, supra note 104, at 1081 (claiming that “historical antecedents such as the bill of peace illustrate
that federal courts have long exercised such authority”).
168
Joe Carter, Justice Scalia’s Two Most Essential Speeches, ETHICS & RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES COMM’N
(Feb. 18, 2016), https://erlc.com/resource-library/articles/justice-scalias-two-most-essential-speeches (quoting
Justice Antonin Scalia when he said, “[Our] manner of interpreting the Constitution is to begin with the text, and
to give that text the meaning that it bore when it was adopted by the people.”).
160
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cites Lewis Publishing Co. and Pierce in arguing that “[a]s far back as 1913, the
Supreme Court” has issued preliminary injunctions applying to non-parties.169
Lewis Publishing Co. and Pierce are contrary to certain conclusions articulated
by Professor Bray regarding courts’ limited equitable power.170 The fact that the
Court did not see an injunction applied to non-parties as inherently
unconstitutional lends support to the proposition that a broad injunction with a
statewide effect would be a permissible compromise position.171 Bray’s
contention that there are certain equitable limitations on the courts garners more
force in the context of litigation based on federal law or litigation seeking a
nationwide injunction.172 The idea that an injunction may apply to non-parties
on a statewide level appears, by all measures, to be acceptable as a traditional
function of courts in equity.173 However, the jump from applying an injunction
with a statewide effect to an injunction applied on a “universal” or nationwide
level is not necessarily warranted simply because it is possible that an injunction
may apply to some non-parties in the context of a plaintiff seeking broad
injunctive relief.174 In the historical context of broad injunctions, this has not
been the case, nor should it be.175 It was historically rare for a court to grant
injunctive relief to non-parties based on federal law.176

169

Sohoni, supra note 112, at 921, 924–25.
Compare id. at 921, with Bray, supra note 5, at 421.
171
See generally Sohoni, supra note 112 (rebutting “the proposition that the universal injunction is a recent
invention” and that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly approved” injunctions against state laws).
172
Bray’s argument is based on sound principles in the context of nationwide injunctions, but courts have
allowed injunctions applying to non-parties in litigation against state laws. See Bray, supra note 5, at 421; see
also Sohoni, supra note 112, at 921 (“[L]ower federal courts have been issuing injunctions that reach beyond
the plaintiffs as to state laws in cases that date back more than a century[.]”).
173
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925); Sohoni, supra note 112, at 926; see also Frost,
supra note 104, at 1081 (“[H]istorical practice supports the conclusion that courts have always had authority to
issue equitable relief that encompasses nonparties.”).
174
See Samuel Bray, Finally, a Court Defends the National Injunction, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14,
2017, 10:04 PM), https://reason.com/2017/10/14/finally-a-court-defends-the-na/ (arguing that the “intuition
behind” a court justifying national injunctions based on a theory that the rule of law is undermined if a court
allows illegal conduct to continue in other jurisdictions is “understandable,” but ultimately misguided because
we do not have a legal system that is “built on the premise that one district judge should try to determine the law
for the entire country”).
175
Id. (arguing that we do not have a legal system that is “built on the premise that one district judge
should try to determine the law for the entire country”); OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 1, at 2 (“The Supreme
Court, from early in its history, has interpreted the equitable power of Article III courts as the power ‘to render
a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties’ consistent with the exercise of such powers at
common law or in English courts of equity.” (quoting Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718
(1838))).
176
See Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (citing Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 923 (1958)).
170
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Traditionally, in litigation over federal law or executive actions, parties
either sought an injunction that applied to the plaintiffs of a case,177 or they
sought declaratory relief.178 In adhering to those principles, a nationwide
injunction should not be the foremost or desired remedy.179 In essence, the
argument that the court is restrained from applying an injunction to non-parties
based on a traditional notion of equity is persuasive,180 but overall, it may not be
the most forceful basis to critique or curb the use of nationwide injunctions. The
stronger argument against the current application of nationwide injunctions rests
on the constitutional limitation of standing for federal courts.181 The idea that a
party requires a concrete and particularized injury182 supports the proposition
that modern-day nationwide injunctions are impermissible more than any
equitable limitation of the court.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED BY AN EXPANSION OF STATE STANDING
A more pervasive and growing argument against the current practice of state
actors seeking nationwide injunctions through the federal court system lies in
standing limitations that stem from Article III’s case or controversy
requirement.183 “Standing” is the idea that an individual or entity may only bring
a lawsuit if they have “enough cause to ‘stand’ before the court.”184 The Court
has stated that Article III’s requirement of “standing is built on a single basic

177

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583–84 (1952).
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 744
(2013); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
179
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
180
See Bray, supra note 5, at 421.
181
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991)
(“At the core of the standing doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff allege personal injury fairly traceable to
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”); Ne. Fla. Chapter
of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992).
182
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
183
See U.S. CONST. art. III.
184
See What is Legal “Standing”?, ALL. DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.adfmedia.org/files/
WhatIsStanding.pdf (last visited June 9, 2021) (“[C]ourts use ‘standing’ to ask” . . . whether a party has “a ‘dog
in [the] fight.’”); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (“[T]o invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action . . . [an individual] must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.”); Tyler v. Judges of Ct. of Registration, 179 U.S. 405,
407, (1900) (“No one can be a party to an action if he has no interest in it. A plaintiff cannot properly sue for
wrongs that do not affect him.”); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922) (noting that a plaintiff does
not have the right to “secure by indirection a determination whether a statute . . . [is] valid,” rather a plaintiff
“has only the right . . . to require that the Government be administered according to law”).
178
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idea—the idea of separation of powers.”185 Under Article III, Section 2, a federal
court may only hear a case or controversy that meets the three requirements of
standing.186 These requirements are: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and
(3) redressability.187 A limitation on standing to demand the three traditional
requirements188 would not restrict an injunction from applying to non-parties.
However, it would restrict the scope of an injunction to apply only to those with
direct injuries.189 Under the injury-in-fact requirement, the party filing suit must
have “some direct injury that is suffered or threatened.”190 A direct injury must
be “concrete and particularized,” as well as “actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.”191 Under the causation requirement, the injury must be “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.”192 Lastly, under the
redressability requirement, the plaintiff must show that “it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.”193 The following section details how state standing has been
expanding in the context of nationwide injunctions against the Trump
Administration in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA and Texas v. United States.
A. State Standing in the Context of Massachusetts v. EPA and Texas v. United
States
Massachusetts v. EPA expanded the notion that sovereign states were
afforded special consideration in determining standing, rather than simply
focusing on the direct and concrete injury that Massachusetts was able to
articulate.194 In Massachusetts, the plaintiffs195 sought review of the EPA’s order
denying a rulemaking petition to address “greenhouse gas emissions from new

185

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, (1984).
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
187
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
188
Id.
189
Traditional theories of standing cut against the grain of third party standing and various parens patriae
theories that violate the traditional standing requirements. Compare City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp.
3d 933, 949–50 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (claiming that the city would suffer a harm based on their “relationship with the
immigrant community” and that although there was no measurable financial injury they would suffer a
“constitutional injury”), with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
190
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, (1923).
191
See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
192
See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–81; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
193
See supra note 192.
194
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515, 517–18 (2007) (“It is of considerable relevance that the
party seeking review . . . is a sovereign State and not . . . a private individual.”).
195
Id. at 510, 514.
186
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motor vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.”196 The State of Massachusetts
claimed it had standing to challenge the EPA based on the particularized injury
of “projected rises in sea level,” caused by global warming, which “would lead
to serious loss of coastal property.”197 At the circuit level, in his dissent, Judge
Tatel argued that the plaintiffs’ affidavits “supported the conclusion that [the]
EPA’s failure to curb greenhouse gas emissions contributed to the sea level
changes that threatened Massachusetts’ coastal property.”198 Judge Tatel
reasoned that such injury was traceable to the EPA because ‘[a]chievable
reductions in emissions of [carbon dioxide] and other [greenhouse gases] from
U.S. motor vehicles would . . . delay and moderate many of the adverse impacts
of global warming.”199
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the State of Massachusetts did have
standing to sue based on the tangible injuries articulated by Judge Tatel.200 In
addition, the Court outlined a theory of quasi-sovereign standing initially stated
by Justice Holmes in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.201 Holmes found that
Georgia had standing to sue under its quasi-sovereign capacity over alleged
injuries to “the earth and air within its domain,” declaring that the state had “the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”202 The Court in Massachusetts expanded
upon this theory by holding that because the state had surrendered its sovereign
prerogatives over controlling emissions to “the Federal Government, and
Congress has ordered [the] EPA to protect Massachusetts,” special consideration
was therefore warranted.203 Although the Court held that the theory of quasisovereign standing was permissible in this context, it was not necessary to
determine the case.204 Massachusetts had satisfied the traditional requirements
of standing by showing a substantial and direct injury to their coastline, partially
caused by the EPA’s failure to act, which was redressable by a favorable
ruling.205

196

Id. at 510.
Id. at 515.
198
Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
199
Id.
200
See id. at 522.
201
See id. at 518–19 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)) (“This is a suit by a
State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign . . . [i]n that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens.”).
202
See id.
203
See id. at 519.
204
See id. at 521–26.
205
See id.
197
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Massachusetts was not a case in which a nationwide injunction against the
federal government was sought;206 however, the case’s theory of quasisovereign standing has been adopted by state actors seeking to implement
nationwide injunctions.207 In utilizing quasi-sovereign interests to assert
standing, Professor Jonathan Nash notes that this theory should be allowed for
situations in which (1) the federal government preempts an area of state law, and
(2) the federal government is underenforcing such “federal law that Congress
enacted to address that very same area.”208 In both Massachusetts v. EPA209 and
Texas v. United States,210 this was precisely the case.211 Massachusetts
surrendered its enforcement power over controlling emissions in reliance that
the EPA would enforce the Clean Air Act,212 and Texas surrendered its power
to control immigration in reliance that the DHS and other federal agencies would
enforce the INA.213 In Texas v. United States, President Obama’s DAPA policy
was essentially a command to do the exact opposite of what the states had
entrusted the federal government to do under the INA.214 This led the court to
conclude that the Obama Administration had virtually abdicated its duty to
enforce the country’s immigration laws.215 Even though Massachusetts and
Texas had standing under Professor Nash’s test of “sovereign preemption state
standing,”216 both states were able to show a direct injury that met all of the
206

See id. at 514 (seeking review of an order denying a rulemaking petition).
See David French, The Nationwide Dysfunction of the District-Court Injunction, NAT’L REV. (June 6,
2019, 10:34 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/24/the-nationwide-dysfunction-of-thedistrict-court-injunction/ (“[A]ctivists work to match plaintiffs, lawyers, and courts to bring just the right claim
in just the right court. Liberal plaintiffs . . . often file suit somewhere in California, especially in San
Francisco . . . , [c]onservative plaintiffs . . . seek more hospitable ground in Texas.”); see also Washington v.
Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump,
265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1149 (D. Haw. 2017); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 950 (N.D. Ill.
2017); Tolan, supra note 5.
208
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. L. REV. 201, 201 (2017).
209
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510, 519–20 (2007).
210
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 151–53 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
211
See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 617 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (noting that even if only 25,000
out of the 500,000 DAPA eligible individuals applied “for a driver’s license[,] . . . Texas [would bear] a net loss
of $130.89 per license, with total losses in excess of several million dollars”); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 515–
16.
212
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510, 519–20 (“These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the
Federal Government, and Congress has ordered [the] EPA to protect Massachusetts.”).
213
See Texas, 809 F.3d at 153.
214
See id. at 153–54 (“These plaintiff states’ interests are like Massachusetts’s, . . . [w]hen the states
joined the union, they surrendered some of their sovereign prerogatives over immigration . . . [and] these
plaintiff states and Massachusetts now rely on the federal government to protect their interests.”).
215
See id. at 149–50 (noting that the district court upheld a new theory of “abdication standing” but
rejected “the notions that Texas could sue as parens patriae on behalf of citizens facing economic competition
from DAPA beneficiaries”).
216
See Nash, supra note 208, at 201.
207
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traditional requirements of Article III standing.217 The discussion of alternative
theories of standing, under a quasi-sovereign capacity, in both Texas and
Massachusetts was unnecessary to decide the case.218
B. State Standing in the Context of Nationwide Injunctions Against the Trump
Administration
In contrast to both Massachusetts and Texas, states that brought lawsuits
against the Trump Administration have stretched the theory of quasi-sovereign
standing to its limits.219 Every nationwide injunction implemented against the
Trump Administration challenged executive action,220 not executive inaction.
No plaintiff asserted that President Trump was “underenforcing” an area of
federal law in which the states have forfeited their sovereign interests, but rather
they were simply challenging the actions that President Trump had taken without
satisfying Article III’s traditional standing requirements.221 Effectively all
nationwide injunctions against the Trump Administration, relying on standing
under their “quasi-sovereign interests,” failed to meet the second requirement of
“sovereign preemption state standing”222 under Massachusetts.223 Courts have
continuously stated that “[p]laintiffs cannot manufacture standing
merely . . . based on their fears of hypothetical future harm[s]” that are not
certain, and “[i]f the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able
to secure a lower standard for [Article III] standing simply by making an
expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.”224 In cases against both President
Trump’s “travel ban” and his executive order regarding conditions on sanctuary
cities, states have asserted these exact “injuries” over their citizens generally.225
District judges, commonly in the Ninth Circuit or various left-leaning districts
throughout the Northeast and Midwest, have permitted nationwide injunctions
217

See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
219
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
220
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp.
3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
221
See Nash, supra note 208, at 201; Mank & Solimine, supra note 8, at 1958–59; see also Texas, 809
F.3d at 153 (noting that in this case, Texas was able to meet the Article III standing requirements by asserting a
direct injury of “millions of dollars of losses in Texas alone,” whereas cases asserted against the Trump
Administration have largely focused on intangible or hypothetical harms).
222
See Nash, supra note 208, at 201.
223
See Mank & Solimine, supra note 8, at 1958–59 (noting that there is a distinction between a state
“invoking quasi-sovereign interests to block federal regulation of its citizens rather than ‘allowing a State to
assert its rights under federal law’”).
224
Texas, 809 F.3d at 159 (citation omitted).
225
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
218
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based on related quasi-sovereign theories of parens patriae226 or “third-party
standing” that rest on faint claims of hypothetical and intangible harms.227
In City of Chicago v. Sessions, Chicago sought a nationwide injunction
against the Trump Administration’s executive action imposing new conditions
on a federal grant that required the city to permit local law enforcement’s
cooperation with the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) to
determine the citizenship status of persons detained in local correctional
facilities.228 Chicago had a policy that prohibited local law enforcement from
cooperating with federal immigration officials.229 City employees were not
allowed to request or provide any information regarding the immigration status
of persons that were arrested or detained.230 The district judge granted a
nationwide injunction, in part, and held that Chicago had standing based on a
theory that “[t]rust between local law enforcement and the people” would be
eroded and “result in increased crime rates.”231 The judge also claimed that, in
any event, the city did not require a showing of irreparable harm because there
was a “constitutional injury,” which was sufficient as a matter of law.232
The idea that standing does not need to be met to implement a nationwide
injunction, based on theories of “constitutional injury,” automatically
necessitates a ruling that is contrary to Article III’s case or controversy
requirement and Supreme Court precedent.233 The Supreme Court in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins vacated and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to require a
finding of a “concrete and particularized” injury.234 The Court explicitly rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s notion that a “violation of a statutory right is usually a
sufficient injury,”235 and in fact required an even more demanding

226
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 593, 602 (1982) (“In order to maintain
a parens patriae action, the state must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties,
that is, the state must be more than a nominal party” and the state must also assert a “quasi-sovereign
interest . . . sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and the defendant.”).
227
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
228
See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936–37 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
229
See id.
230
See id. at 938.
231
See id. at 950.
232
See id.
233
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543–44 (2016) (stating that “a plaintiff does not
automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a right,” and “Robins cannot satisfy
the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation”); see also Nash, supra note 2, at 2009. See
generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
234
See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1543–44.
235
See id. at 1543 (“Because the Ninth Circuit failed to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact
requirement, its Article III standing analysis was incomplete.”).
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“concreteness” standard when the harm is only “intangible.”236 A plaintiff
cannot circumvent the notion of standing by simply claiming that a statutory or
constitutional right was violated; the plaintiff must still satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement of standing.237 The cases cited by the district judge in City of
Chicago v. Sessions were cases of narrowly tailored, plaintiff-protective
injunctions prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Spokeo.238 Such assertions are
in direct opposition to both traditional limitations on standing, as well as
limitations on quasi-sovereign and parens patriae standing.239 Courts should be
weary of advancing this proposition. If a “constitutional injury” was sufficient
to implement a nationwide injunction, as opposed to a plaintiff-protective
injunction, then an unlimited number of plaintiffs could halt executive policy on
a nationwide level by asserting that any constitutional right was infringed
upon.240 Allowing a nationwide injunction based on a “constitutional injury” or
standing under various quasi-sovereign and parens patriae theories, without
making a showing of any concrete injury, is undesirable on a bipartisan level
because it circumvents Article III’s case or controversy requirement for the
expedience of politically motivated lawsuits.
Ultimately, state actors have proven to be plaintiffs that are increasingly
bringing cases based on weak claims of injury and unconvincing forms of
standing to seek nationwide injunctions as political victories against executive
administrations that their constituents oppose.241 Although the State of Texas, in
seeking a nationwide injunction, brought a valid suit based on a direct and
verifiable financial harm,242 it appears to be more of an outlier than the general
rule in the current political climate. The various “injuries” asserted to obtain

236
See Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2285, 2285
(2018) (“The Court indicated that a plaintiff, in order to have constitutional standing, needed to suffer harm that
was ‘concrete’ or ‘real’ . . . [and] the Court created a category of “intangible” harm subject to a distinctive, and
arguably more demanding, concreteness inquiry than ‘tangible’ harm.”).
237
See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1543.
238
See Doe v. Mundy, 514 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming a district court order granting a
preliminary plaintiff protective injunction and declaratory relief for a class action suit brought by pregnant
women challenging a hospital regulation); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011)
(reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction against the City of Chicago’s “firing-range ban”).
239
See Nash, supra note 2, at 2010 (“[T]hat these doctrines necessarily validate the nationwide injunction
is quite a stretch . . . .”); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 159 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that “plaintiffs cannot
manufacture standing merely . . . based on their fears of hypothetical future harm[s]”); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v.
Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6, 12 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of plausibly alleging
or proffering facts that, if accepted as true, would establish that they have standing to sue.”).
240
See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 689–90.
241
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
242
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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state standing have perhaps been taken too far.243 District judges are now
allowing nationwide injunctions based on quasi-sovereign interests in the
context of executive action,244 not underenforcement. Limitations on the scope
of an injunction, brought by a state actor in a lower federal court, should be
restricted to a singular geographic state to protect the rest of the country from
politically motivated actors freezing up the enforcement of executive policies on
a nationwide level. Dozens of states, thousands of miles away, should not have
a nationwide injunction thrust upon them by an individual state actor who may—
or may not—be able to articulate a theory of a direct and verifiable harm.245
IV. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE POLITICAL FORCES CREATING THE ISSUE
The current academic debate over the permissibility of nationwide
injunctions, in an equitable sense, focuses more on the downsides of their
implementation, while the issue of relaxed state standing reflects the political
motivations and root causes of nationwide injunctions.246 In merging the two
issues to assess how the judicial power is currently being abused, it is relevant
to first understand why the drawbacks of nationwide injunctions outweigh any
perceived benefit before turning to the political factors looming in the shadows.
Recognizing the undesirability of nationwide injunctions, which promote an
expansion of state standing and the court’s equitable powers,247 reveals why it is
unsavory to allow political forces to take hold of the judicial system. The
following section explores the dangers of nationwide injunctions, rebuts their
perceived benefits, and discusses the political motivations contributing to the
issue.

243

See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
See supra note 211 and accompanying text. See generally Nash, supra note 208, at 201 (“Although
sovereign preemption state standing could conceivably extend to Executive Branch overenforcement, such an
application would not square with the functional justification for the doctrine.”).
245
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
246
Compare Frost, supra note 104, at 1090 (addressing the costs and benefits of nationwide injunctions,
and the equitable authority to issue such injunctions), and Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 2095, 2102–03 (2017) (focusing on the courts’ power to issue nationwide injunctions as a form of
“complete relief”), with Nash, supra note 2, at 1992 (discussing the political motivations of states’ attorneys
general “to file lawsuits against federal government action and programs with which she and her constituents
disagree”).
247
Compare Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992), with Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp.
3d 1140, 1149 (D. Haw. 2017).
244
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A. Dangers of Nationwide Injunctions
Former-Attorney General William Barr has stated that “[n]ationwide
injunctions undermine the democratic process, depart from history and
tradition[,] . . . and impede sound judicial administration, all at the cost of public
confidence in . . . our courts as apolitical decision makers.”248 Many critics of
nationwide injunctions echo this position and claim that the use of nationwide
injunctions “encourages forum shopping and . . . arrests the development of law
in the federal system.”249 Fundamentally, the dangers of nationwide injunctions
generally fall into three broad categories: (1) forum shopping, (2) expansion of
the judicial power, and (3) restrictions on federal lawmaking ability.
1. Forum Shopping
The first danger of nationwide injunctions is the extensive forum shopping
that occurs in seeking out the most favorable ruling.250 It is no coincidence that
injunctions opposing President Obama’s policies have been issued in more
conservative judicial districts, while injunctions opposing President Trump’s
policies have come out of more liberal districts.251 State actors seeking to enjoin
an executive administration’s policies seek out the most favorable district and
circuit to file suit.252 If an individual district judge upholds an executive policy
or declines to hear a case based on a lack of standing, the state actor is not
precluded from bringing suit elsewhere.253 However, once an individual district
judge hears a case and issues a nationwide injunction, “the injunction controls
the defendant’s actions with respect to everyone.”254 Professor Bray notes that
the incentive to forum shop until the executive policy is invalidated creates a
situation in which state actors are forum shopping until “the statute drops.”255
2. Power Grab
The second danger of nationwide injunctions is the fact that the use of these
injunctions “give[s] enormous power to a single district court judge,”256 which
is contrary to the traditional view of how the lower federal courts should
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

Benner, supra note 89.
Bray, supra note 5, at 419.
See id.; see also Tolan, supra note 5.
See Bray, supra note 5, at 459–60.
See id. at 460; see Tolan, supra note 5.
See Bray, supra note 5, at 460.
See id.
See id.
Frost, supra note 104, at 1069.
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function.257 As a product of the evolving role of the federal court system, most
Americans accept the idea of judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court in
reflecting on “the key role that the Court played in the civil rights movement.”258
However, the notion of expansive “judicial supremacy,” a view that the judicial
branch’s pronouncement of the law is supreme, does not necessarily carry over
to individual district courts that are subject to further review at the circuit and
Supreme Court level.259 To prevent the accumulation of powers in the judicial
branch,260 there is an inherent need to strike a balance between judicial review
from a panel of nine Justices, and the implementation of nationwide injunctions
at the hands of a single district judge.261 Lower federal courts should seek to
maintain their prior function of simply refusing to apply an unconstitutional law,
vis-à-vis a declaratory judgement, rather than preemptively “striking down” the
law before the Supreme Court has had the benefit of multiple
pronouncements.262
3. Development of Law
The third danger of nationwide injunctions is that they hinder the efficient
development of law in the federal system. Under United States v. Mendoza, “the
federal government is not subject to non-mutual issue preclusion”; however,
once a national injunction is implemented, it essentially freezes the development
of law and makes it exceedingly “hard to relitigate a question.”263 Under the
“standard model” of vertical precedent, “lower courts within a geographical
jurisdiction are bound by relevant precedent announced by higher courts within
that jurisdiction.”264 A decision announced by the Supreme Court would

257
See Bray, supra note 5, at 449–52 (“A national injunction in an individual action would be illogical,
almost unthinkable.”)
258
Carson Holloway, Against Judicial Supremacy: The Founders and the Limits on the Courts, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/against-judicial-supremacy-the-founders-andthe-limits-the-courts.
259
Id.
260
See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) (claiming that the accumulation of powers in one branch of the government, “whether of one, a few,
or many,” is “the very definition of tyranny” that the federal constitution sought to avoid).
261
OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 1, at 4 (“The Supreme Court has explicitly affirmed the importance of
percolation in the lower courts—particularly when the government is involved[.]”); see also Holloway, supra
note 258 (“[T]his expansive modern understanding of the judicial power is inconsistent with the argument put
forward in the single most authoritative commentary on the Constitution to emerge from the founding, The
Federalist [Papers].”).
262
See Bray, supra note 5, at 451; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
263
Berger, supra note 30, at 1072.
264
Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2010).
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effectively resolve the matter.265 However, once a “policy is enjoined
nationwide,” the government “cannot enforce it, the regulated parties do not sue,
and courts never hear the issue again[;] . . . [t]he law is frozen against the
government.”266 This freezing of the law by an individual district court occurs
because enforcement of the executive policy constructively disappears.267
Nonenforcement of the executive policy on a nationwide scale “breaks down”
the federal precedential system by preventing a contrary ruling from another
district or circuit.268 The only way for the government to challenge an adverse
ruling is to appeal the case to the circuit presiding over the district in which the
decision was initially made.269 Because state actors have already forum shopped
to find the most favorable district judge and circuit to file within, the government
is fighting an uphill battle.270
Geographically restricting a district court’s power to implement an
injunction would allow the government to continue to enforce an executive
policy in any and all states that have not successfully brought suit to enjoin the
policy.271 Allowing a diversity of opinion among the circuits is recognized as an
essential function of the lower courts, especially in the context of important legal
issues.272 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has noted, “we have in many instances
recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of
‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts
may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this
Court.”273
B. Rebutting the Cited Benefits of Nationwide Injunctions
Some frequently cited benefits of nationwide injunctions include:
(1) complete relief to plaintiffs,274 (2) protection of nonparties from “irreparable

265

See id. at 1455–56.
Berger, supra note 30, at 1087.
267
See id. at 1072.
268
See Dobbins, supra note 264, at 1456.
269
See Bray, supra note 5, at 460.
270
See id.; Tolan, supra note 5.
271
See Berger, supra note 30, at 1086–87.
272
Id. at 1086–88 (noting that “short-term circuit splits are beneficial, not detrimental”); see Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
273
Evans, 514 U.S. at 23 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
274
See Frost, supra note 104, at 1090–91; Siddique, supra note 246, at 2111–12; see also Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (arguing that in the context of a class action brought under Rule 23, a
nationwide class is not “inconsistent with principles of equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief
is dictated by the extent of the violation established”).
266
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injury,”275 (3) administrability,276 and (4) uniformity in law.277 The thrust of the
arguments in favor of broad injunctions lie in the principle that the judicial
system values uniformity and efficiency.278 However, “uniformity” must be
balanced with “regional percolation.”279 The concept of uniformity does not
necessarily have to be nationwide. Uniformity within a circuit or district may be
broad enough to easily administer and provide relief to affected plaintiffs
without foreclosing the essential “periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse
opinions from, state and federal appellate courts.”280 An injunction limited to
statewide application, when a state actor is the party bringing suit, can create
sufficient diversity in opinion to allow the Supreme Court to have a welldeveloped body of law if it decides to address an issue with potential nationwide
implications.281 Many contemporary cases currently being litigated would be
well suited to a statewide injunction. Specifically, litigation regarding the Trump
Administration’s policy toward sanctuary cities did not require a nationwide
injunction; it was primarily an issue for specific cities.282 In the event that a
geographically limited injunction is impracticable, a state actor can always bring
suit seeking declaratory relief.283
Professor Amanda Frost claims that “certain types of federal policies with
nationwide effects” would be “extremely difficult to enjoin application of the
policy to some plaintiffs but not others.”284 While this may be true for some
specific cases, it is important to note that these plaintiffs are not without
recourse. If a state actor brings suit and a statewide injunction is not practicable,
the court system is still available to hear the case and issue a declaratory
judgment if standing is met.285 This practice was traditionally how the
overwhelming majority of courts approached national issues.286 National

275

See Frost, supra note 104, at 1094–95.
See id. at 1098.
277
Berger, supra note 30, at 1071.
278
Id. at 1071–72.
279
Id.
280
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
281
See id.
282
This policy dealt with funding for specific sanctuary cities. If a city had chosen not to follow the policy,
the only consequence was that the individual city would receive less federal funding. See City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 935–36 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
283
See generally Bray, supra note 5, at 451 (“The traditional conception is that a judge does not so much
strike down an unconstitutional law as refuse to apply it[.]”).
284
See Frost, supra note 104, at 1069.
285
See Bray, supra note 5, at 450–51, 461.
286
See id. (noting that, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the federal district
court judge in Florida practiced “judicial self-restraint” in taking the traditional approach of “having . . . decided
that the entire statute was unconstitutional” without granting a nationwide injunction, which is contrary to the
276
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius perfectly illustrates how a case
implicating “certain types of federal policies with nationwide effects” could be
decided without utilizing a nationwide injunction.287
Sebelius involved the constitutional validity of the individual mandate under
the Affordable Care Act, which required persons to either maintain health
insurance or pay a “shared responsibility payment.”288 Prior to the Supreme
Court hearing the case, a “federal district court judge in Florida held the
individual mandate unconstitutional, and also held that it could not be
severed.”289 In reaching this holding, the district court “could easily have
concluded that enforcement of the statute should be enjoined throughout the
country,” but instead chose to grant a declaratory judgment, which allowed the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to continue plans for carrying
out the statute.290 If the district judge had implemented a nationwide injunction,
“HHS would have lost seven and a half irreplaceable months for preparing to
roll out the regulations for the statute.”291 As seen in Sebelius, if an issue is one
of grave national significance, the Supreme Court can elect to hear the case and
make a final pronouncement of the law.292 This, in turn, would allow the
executive policy to continue to be enforced until the Supreme Court issues a
decision.293 Ultimately, the arguments in favor of nationwide injunctions are
outweighed by their pitfalls of freezing out the rule of law and subjecting the
judicial system to a political supermarket to find the most favorable judge to the
state’s case.294
C. Political Factors Leading to Nationwide Injunctions
The two primary factors leading to the rise of nationwide injunctions are
(1) the increasing geographic political polarization of U.S. voters, coupled with
(2) the political incentives of state attorneys general to file suit against the
federal government.295 These two factors are intertwined in a tragedy of the

“change for some judges in their self-conception of what they are doing vis-à-vis an unconstitutional statute”).
287
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). Contra Frost, supra note 104, at 1069
(arguing that in some contexts nationwide injunctions are “the only means to provide plaintiffs with complete
relief” and “anything short of a nationwide injunction would be impossible to administer”).
288
See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519.
289
Bray, supra note 5, at 460.
290
See id. at 460–61.
291
Id. at 461.
292
See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519; see also Dobbins, supra note 264, at 1455–56.
293
Dobbins, supra note 264, at 1455–56.
294
Tolan, supra note 5.
295
See ECONOMIST, supra note 31; Nash, supra note 2, at 1992.
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commons-like situation that favors the self-interests of those utilizing a
nationwide injunction as a political tool to the detriment of democracy.
1. Political Polarization on a Geographic Level
“Americans are increasingly choosing to live among like-minded
neighbors,” which has led to a clustering of similar political beliefs on a
geographic level.296 The electoral geography of the United States has become
clustered at a district and county level; “the proportion of Americans who live
in . . . landslide counties” nearly doubled from 26.8% for the 1976 election of
President Jimmy Carter to 48.3% for the 2004 reelection of President George
W. Bush.297 Party affiliation by state and district reaffirms the common notion
that certain areas of the country show a political preference.298 The theory of
“political segregation” results in certain states and areas of the country being
regarded as more politically homogenous, thereby creating a simple proxy to
guide state attorneys general in thwarting divergent policies.299 This concept is
supported by the fact that nationwide injunctions opposing executive actions
seemingly correspond with the relative political leanings of the district and state
in which an individual district judge presides.300 Many critics of formerPresident Trump tout California’s perceived success in utilizing nationwide
injunctions against his Administration.301 However, Paul Nolette, a “Marquette
political science professor . . . tracking all multi-state lawsuits against the Trump
[A]dministration,”302 has noted that “[a] big part of [California’s success] is
venue-shopping,” and that “California . . . has the ability to file in one of the
most . . . [liberal] districts in the country.”303

296

ECONOMIST, supra note 31.
Id.
298
See Party Affiliation by State (2014), PEW RSCH. CTR., https://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/compare/party-affiliation/by/state/ (last visited June 9, 2021).
299
See ECONOMIST, supra note 31; see also Nash, supra note 2, at 1991–92 (“The increase in political
polarization across the nation has resulted in some states being solidly ‘red’ or Republican, while other states
being solidly ‘blue’ or Democratic.”).
300
See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 298; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (2015); Washington
v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017); City of Chicago
v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
301
See Tolan, supra note 5; see Chris Nichols, Is California Really ‘Winning’ in Court Against the Trump
Administration?, POLITIFACT (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/california/statements/2019/sep/25/
xavier-becerra/california-really-winning-court-against-trump-admi/.
302
Nichols, supra note 301.
303
Tolan, supra note 5.
297
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2. Political Motivations of State Attorneys General
The increasing use of nationwide injunctions filed by state actors is also
attributable to a state attorney general’s independent political motivations, not
just those of their citizens generally.304 The belief that a nationwide injunction
can be used as an offensive tool to strike down “government statutes,
regulations, and programs” makes them ripe political capital if an individual
state attorney general is able to score a “victory” for their solidly “red” or “blue”
state against a presidential administration of an opposing party.305 Almost every
state elects their attorney general for a term of four years,306 and if the attorney
general is popular, they often run for governor.307 In a period of heightened
political polarization,308 the incentive for a state attorney general to seek out a
nationwide injunction is at its apex.309 The fact that state attorneys general are
the strategists behind the expansive use of nationwide injunctions is quite ironic
considering that, at the federal level, “[t]he Framers of the Constitution” had
intended to “place the Attorney General under the control of the President,
thereby adopting the model of the unitary executive.”310 The states rejected the
federal model and created independent attorneys general selected by popular
election.311
These two factors lend support to the idea that an injunction brought about
by a state actor should be limited to the respective geographic state. The
boundaries of each federal judicial circuit are drawn at various state lines,312 and
304

See Nash, supra note 2, at 1992.
See id. at 1991–92; see also Bray, supra note 5, at 450 (noting an ideological shift in which some judges
no longer think “of an injunction against enforcement . . . primarily in antisuit terms” but rather “primarily as a
challenge to the law itself”).
306
See Attorney General Office Comparison, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Attorney_General_
office_comparison (last visited June 9, 2021) (indicating that forty-three states publicly elect their attorney
general, one state elects via state legislature, and “[o]f the forty-four elected attorneys general, all serve fouryear terms with the exception of Vermont, who serves a two-year term.”).
307
See Nash, supra note 2, at 1992 (claiming that state attorneys general often have “higher political
ambitions”).
308
See Lee Drutman, American Politics Has Reached Peak Polarization, VOX (Mar. 24, 2016, 4:20 PM),
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/3/24/11298808/american-politics-peak-polarization (illustrating that
party polarization is at its highest level since the late 1800s); Jennifer Lynn McCoy, Extreme Political
Polarization Weakens Democracy – Can the US Avoid that Fate?, CONVERSATION (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:12 AM),
http://theconversation.com/extreme-political-polarization-weakens-democracy-can-the-us-avoid-that-fate105540 (“Perceptions that ‘[i]f you win, I lose’ grow[,] . . . [and] [e]ach side views the other political party and
their supporters as a threat to the nation or their way of life if that other political party is in power.”).
309
See Nash, supra note 2, at 1992.
310
William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from
the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2451 (2006).
311
Id.
312
Maps of Judicial Circuits, Judgeships, and Meeting Places, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
305
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each state is divided into one or more judicial districts.313 To protect individual
states, who may support an executive policy, from tyranny, the effect of a broad
injunction should be restricted geographically. Allowing a handful of individual
district judges and state attorneys general to dictate policy for the entire nation
is a harrowing concept. As David French writes, “[c]ourts are supposed to be the
refuge of the illegally oppressed, not a haven for the politically aggrieved.”314
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: STATEWIDE LIMITATION TO INJUNCTIONS
BROUGHT BY STATE ACTORS
To revert back to the traditional principles of standing, the Supreme Court
should course correct the ever-expanding interpretation of Massachusetts v.
EPA.315 The Court should not have to wait too long to address this issue
considering the attenuated theories of standing that have been asserted to
implement nationwide injunctions.316 Although the Court declined to address the
issue in Department of Homeland Security v. New York, Justice Gorsuch’s
effective concurrence strikes at the heart of the frustration.317 Justice Gorsuch
pleaded for the court to address the issue by stating that “[i]t has become
increasingly apparent that this Court must, at some point, confront . . . this
increasingly widespread practice,” and the hysteria of rushing “from one
preliminary injunction hearing to another,” instead of “methodically developing
arguments and evidence, . . . is not normal.”318
In conjunction with a judicial pronouncement on the issue of standing,
Congress should enact concrete federal legislation geographically limiting an
injunction sought out by individual state actors as a fallback measure. If concrete
legislation addressing state actors is not implemented, the various state attorneys
general could continue to extensively forum shop for the most favorable district
to implement a nationwide injunction.319 This practice would inevitably chip
away at any pronouncement by the Court on the issue of standing.320 A strict
geographic limitation on state attorneys general seeking a broad injunction
history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/federal-judicial-circuits (last visited June 9, 2021).
313
About U.S. Federal Courts, FED. BAR ASS’N, http://www.fedbar.org/Public-Messaging/About-USFederal-Courts_1.aspx (last visited June 9, 2021).
314
See French, supra note 207.
315
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
316
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
317
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
318
Id.
319
See Tolan, supra note 5.
320
See generally Bray, supra note 5, at 451–52 (noting the common ideological shift of some judges and
when they believe unconstitutional statutes, regulations, etc., should be “struck down”).
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would be necessary to prevent a relapse to the judicial system’s current situation.
This section will set forth a two-part solution: (1) advocating for a traditional
interpretation of the injury requirement in standing, and (2) imposing a
geographic limit to an injunction brought by state actors.
A. Encouraging Judicial Restraint and Addressing Standing
The judicial branch is vested with the “power to decide cases for parties, not
questions for everyone.”321 Nationwide injunctions represent a constitutionally
murky and politically undesirable headache for the efficient governing of the
country.322 Courts should seek to peel back recent expansions to the doctrine of
standing323 and exercise judicial restraint when addressing cases in which the
plaintiff seeks a nationwide injunction.324 The Supreme Court should revisit the
standing doctrine to delineate limits to Massachusetts v. EPA and various other
forms of third-party and quasi-sovereign standing.325 The Court should
explicitly reject the contention that “hypothetical” and “intangible” harms to a
state’s citizens are permissive grounds to bring suit, and clarify that only a direct
and tangible injury is sufficient to meet standing.326 Reverting back to a time
when standing required an injury-in-fact would act as a screener to ferret out
suits challenging executive action without a concrete injury.327
B. Federal Legislation as a Concrete Solution
As a fallback measure, when appeals to judicial restraint and standing
limitations fail, Congress should limit an injunction brought by a state actor to
the geographic state in which the enjoining district judge presides through
federal legislation. The recent idea that a lower federal court can offensively
challenge the validity of a statue or executive policy can lead to a strained
reading of any pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the issue of standing.328
Previous bills proposed by Congress have failed to gain much bipartisan support
because they focused on limiting courts’ equitable power to the specific parties
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Id. at 421 (citing Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011); Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)).
322
See id.; Nash, supra note 2, at 1992 (“[T]o the extent that litigants have a choice among courts that
might rule differently on the merits, litigants and lawyers may have an opportunity, and indeed an incentive, to
forum shop.”).
323
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
324
See Bray, supra note 5, at 460–61.
325
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517, 518 (2007).
326
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
327
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740, 746, 751 (1984).
328
See Bray, supra note 5, at 451.
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of a particular suit as opposed to placing limits on the geographic scope of an
injunction.329 In addition to the lack of support for such proposals, passing a law
proscribing a limit of an injunction to only the parties of a suit still creates the
potential for a “quasi-national injunction” by allowing dozens of states to join a
lawsuit to gain party status.330 Limiting an injunction to only apply to parties
does little to curb the abuse of the judicial power when all of the individual states
could theoretically join a single lawsuit.331
Federal legislation passed should require any state attorney general seeking
an injunction against a federal law or executive policy, to file suit in a district
court located within their respective state. If a district court finds standing based
on a direct injury and believes that a statewide injunction, as opposed to a
declaratory judgment, is feasible and proper, the court may then prescribe a
geographically limited statewide injunction against enforcement of the
executive policy for the individual state bringing suit. If the federal government
appeals such a ruling to the circuit level of that district, the circuit court is
restricted from broadening any injunction and may only affirm or reverse the
case. Restricting the circuit courts from broadening an injunction beyond a
statewide effect, as opposed to a circuit-wide injunction, is necessary to protect
other states’ interests within a geographic circuit that may support an executive
policy.332 Critics of geographic limitations claim that in some cases a
geographically limited injunction would be unworkable. However, even if a
statewide injunction has no net effect on enjoining an executive policy, as would
be the case in some immigration contexts,333 the injunction would still carry the
force of a declaratory judgment, which was sufficient relief for the first century
and a half of the nation’s judicial history and more recently in Sebelius.334
Geographically limiting an injunction brought by a state actor is a better
bright-line solution because it is not subject to any broad form of interpretation.
A geographic limitation is permissible because Congress’s authority to define
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See Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, 115 H.R. 6730.
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that over half of U.S. states joined
as parties to the litigation against DAPA).
331
See id.
332
Some states located in the Ninth Circuit are conservative. For example, Idaho and Montana are
generally safely Republican states with around 60% of their citizens voting for Trump in 2016, while over 60%
of the citizens in California and Hawaii voted for Hillary Clinton. See Historical Presidential Election
Information by State, 270 TO WIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/ (last visited June 9, 2021); see
ECONOMIST, supra note 31; PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 298.
333
See Texas, 809 F.3d at 188 (“[A] geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because
DAPA beneficiaries would be free to move among states.”).
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See supra notes 105 and 290.
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the scope of lower federal courts lies within a textually demonstrable
commitment to the legislative branch.335 The Supreme Court, or a court of
appeals, could effectively strike down the actions of a rogue district judge with
relative ease by simply holding that a nationwide injunction is prohibited under
federal law. Gretzel Berger has previously proposed a “circuit-border” rule to be
implemented by the Supreme Court.336 In 2017, he believed that the Court would
implement such a rule through the “travel-ban” cases. 337 The Supreme Court did
not address the issue in 2018,338 and it declined to set out a geographic solution
again in 2020.339 Therefore, federal law looks to be a better solution.
CONCLUSION
The judicial branch is currently at risk of becoming a political tool at the
hands of the various state attorneys general.340 The Framers intended the federal
court system to issue unbiased decisions and to be insulated from political
whims. The current practice of issuing nationwide injunctions against significant
executive policies based on hypothetical and intangible harms has caused a vast
expansion to traditional standing requirements and the court’s equitable
power.341 Previous appeals to the Supreme Court to address the issue of
nationwide injunctions and standing have proven fruitless.342 Politically
motivated state attorneys general, coupled with individual district judges willing
to grant nationwide injunctions, are the culprits behind the problem. A
geographic solution tailored to address these individuals is appropriate. Enacting
these limitations on lower courts would curb the abuse of the judicial power, and
hopefully restore the public’s confidence in the judicial branch.343 The executive
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See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Berger, supra note 30, at 1105.
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338
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
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Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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See Nash, supra note 2, at 1992.
341
See supra Part III.
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See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Trump, 138 S.
Ct. at 2423.
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2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-judicial-branch-sinks-new-low.aspx.
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and legislative branches have enough politics—the judicial system should stick
to the law.
JOSEPH D. KMAK
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